The evaluation of the effectiveness of global navigation satellite system (GNSS) spoofing and jamming equipment is not only an important means of enhancing the power of modern satellite navigation countermeasures, but also a dynamic decision-making problem, whose complexity manifests as the uncertainty of information used to make decisions (e.g., fuzziness, randomness, and dynamics). Previously, full consideration was given to the dynamics of decision information, as well the fuzzy, stochastic problems of quantitative and qualitative data when integrated with subjective and objective information. In this study, first, a spoofing mode index was established based on the performance analysis results of the spoofing equipment and target receivers during antagonized navigation. Second, a combined interval number eigenvalue method (IEM) algorithm with ternary association numbers, and entropy-weighting of the interval were used to combine weights, while considering the uncertainty of judged index weights and their subjectivity. Using a fuzzy comprehensive assessment of the interval and the superposition of multiple expertderived joint scores, a profit matrix was constructed and solved using game theory to reveal the advantages of this approach in dealing with dynamic problems. Finally, the uncertainty of decision information was fully considered by applying the proposed method to practical application and dynamic analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
The degree to which the global navigation satellite system (GNSS) spoofing and jamming equipment can achieve the expected goals during a spoofing task can be determined by evaluating the efficacy of the equipment. The scientific and accurate evaluation of the spoofing equipment can not only enhance the countermeasure capabilities of modern satellite navigation information, but also help manufacturers improve the core performance of the equipment on demand [1] . Additionally, the evaluation process is also a complex and dynamic decision-making problem [2] , which primarily manifests in the uncertainty of decision-making information, (e.g., fuzziness, randomness, and dynamical behavior). Among them, the uncertainty of decision-making information is derived from: (1) changes in target receivers and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which are hereafter referred to as ''target machine (working systems)'', (2) the indeterminacy of the spoofing modes of equipment, (3) electromagnetic
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Mu Zhou . environment, (4) diversity of evaluation indices, (5) lack of ''true'' data, (6) differences among ''expert'' judgments, and (7) multidimensionality of evaluations. Therefore, evaluating the effectiveness of the decision-making information of GNSS equipment poses a problem with respect to the comprehensive integration of subjective/objective information, quantitative/qualitative data, and a dynamic game problem.
In recent years, scholars across various fields have adopted different methods in a bid to reduce the uncertainty that is inherent while evaluating the GNSS efficacy. Specifically, grey correlation analyses based on interval numbers and different algorithms [3] , [4] have been combined to comprehensively evaluate various machine gun design schemes and thus solve the problem of uncertain discrimination among multiple schemes. In other studies [5] , [6] , the interval theory has been combined with the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) and fuzzy comprehensive evaluation theory, and an evaluation method based on interval numbers has been proposed for related projects in a power grid. Moreover, subjective and objective integrations (combined weight) have been used in other studies [7] , [8] to determine the relevant performance VOLUME 8, 2020 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ of equipment. These models and methods have, to some extent, reduced the uncertainty in the process of evaluating the effectiveness of different subjects. However, it is difficult to solely employ these methods in the evaluation of GNSS spoofing and jamming equipment; this is because the objects of the above-mentioned evaluations are not in the navigation domains. Further, comprehensively considering the dynamics of decision-making information and fuzziness as well as randomness is challenging during the integration of such information.
Owing to the multidimensional and multilevel nature of GNSS evaluations, fuzzy comprehensive evaluations are the most appropriate for evaluating the effectiveness of GNSS spoofing and jamming equipment. The combined weight is an effective way of integrating quantitative and qualitative data as well as subjective and objective information. However, there are many uncertainties in these two traditional approaches. To overcome this drawback, the interval theory was first integrated with the combined weight and fuzzy comprehensive evaluation theory; this was aimed at obtaining an interval number form for all the elements involved to effectively deal with the fuzziness and randomness of decisionmaking factors and improve the credibility of the results. Second, game theory was introduced into the dynamic evaluation of the effectiveness of the spoofing and jamming equipment. At present, game theory is widely applied to the dynamic evaluation of jamming effects during radar antagonism [9] - [11] . Although the models and methods used for this purpose are relatively mature, these are not completely applicable for the evaluation of jamming effects in navigation antagonism. Therefore, to construct a profit matrix and to account for the uncertainty of evaluation, a weighted superposition method was employed; herein, the profit matrix was the core element of the navigation antagonism game. This approach combined an interval-valued fuzzy comprehensive evaluation and the joint scores of multiple experts. Finally, the evaluation results that were similar to the realworld situation were obtained using a linear programming algorithm.
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF A MATRIX MODEL AND INDEX SYSTEM BASED ON GAME THEORY
The relationship between spoofing and anti-spoofing is equivalent to the relationship between a spear and a shield. It is difficult to obtain a method that can deal with all the types of spoofing, and it is also challenging to produce a spoofing and jamming approach to break through all the types of detection algorithms. Moreover, the ''zero-sum law'' dictates that the one with the priority of information is more likely to take the initiative. If the spoofing party obtains the motion states of the target machine and anti-spoofing strategies as well as adopts the corresponding spoofing modes, the interference success rate will be improved significantly. In addition, the availability and reliability of anti-spoofing techniques will be improved.
A. STRATEGIC MATRIX MODEL IN AN ANTAGONISTIC GAME
Game theory is the study of rational behavior in a situation of mutual inclusion and interdependence. Regardless of the type of game, the following three elements are always present: players, the pure strategy space of each player, and the profit matrix of the players. In navigation antagonism, spoofing equipment and target institutions become the game players At i and Df j , where i stands for a certain spoofing mode and j stands for an anti-spoofing measure. The spoofing mode contained in the spoofing equipment is its pure strategy space, S Ati = (At 1 , At 2 , . . . , At 5 ), and the corresponding anti-spoofing measure taken by the target machine is its pure strategy space, S Dfj = (Df 1 , Df 2 , . . . , Df 5 ). The two players have opposing goals and different evaluations of criteria, but their metrics are the same. Therefore, the effectiveness of spoofing and jamming is a standard measurement for both sides, and their values jointly form the profit matrix.
Combined with studies on anti-spoofing and spoofing technologies, four typical anti-spoofing measures and five spoofing modes were set in this study. Because the spoofing and jamming mode of a signal transmitted by a single antenna is easy to be detected by defenders, this condition was not included here. When the spoofing mode of the equipment is At i and the spoofing measure adopted by the target machine is Df j the corresponding efficacy of spoofing and jamming is represented as E ij . The strategy matrix in the antagonistic game then equals the following: According to the level and order of signal processing performed by the target machine, the principles of spoofing and jamming, and their characteristic rapidity as well as concealment were selected as the six universal indices for each spoofing mode, including: (1) the time when the jamming signal was accessed by the target machine, (2) maximum jamming distance, (3) accuracy of pseudo-range rates, (4) pseudorange measuring accuracy, (5) spoofing position accuracy, and (6) timing accuracy of synchronous clock. The specific indices applicable to each spoofing mode were then selected. Those belonging to the repeater spoofing and jamming mode included the controllability of high-precision time-delays and the power intensity of noise; however, those belonging to the generation spoofing and jamming mode were the Doppler loss, the power intensity of spoofing signals, and the success rate of spoofing. Additionally, the specific indices belonging to the spoofing mode in the capture phase were the ratio of the power levels of correlation peaks and the average capture time. Because the prerequisites of spoofing and jamming in a synchronized code phase were too strict, spoofing and jamming in an asynchronous code phase was adopted by default during tracking; further, its specific indices represented the success rate of spoofing and the time required for the tracking loop of the target machine to gain traction. The indices that belonged to the spoofing and jamming mode of a multiantenna transmitting signal were the relative positions of the transmitting antenna and target machine with satellites, and the ability to control the Doppler carrier frequency. Finally, Df 1 and Df 2 could deal with all jamming modes, Df 3 could emphatically resist At 1 , and Df 4 could better cope with At 1 and At 4 . See Figure 1 for details.
III. ESTABLISHMENT OF A PROFIT MATRIX BASED ON INTERVAL-VALUED FUZZY COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION A. DETERMINATION OF FACTOR AND EVALUATION SETS
The factor set determined according to the hierarchical index system of the spoofing mode, O = ([o L ij , o U ij ]) m×n (original value before standardization), of each index can be obtained. Here, i stands for a certain spoofing mode, m is the total number of spoofing modes, j is the corresponding index of a certain spoofing mode, and n is the number of indices included in a certain spoofing mode. To make the evaluation results applicable to real-world situations, the interval value of the original data must be set as the possible range of values for each index parameter in a complex electromagnetic environment (i.e., o L ij represents the minimum value that the index in a certain spoofing mode can obtain under any real test environment and o U ij represents the maximum value that the corresponding index can achieve).
An evaluation set, V, was constructed according to the actual needs of the study. Five levels of evaluation were performed, V = (v 1 , v 2 , v 3 , v 4 , v 5 ), and the equivalent classifiers, excellent; good; medium; average; and poor were assigned. In addition, the corresponding levels were converted into values ranging from 0 to 1. This structure rendered it easier to distinguish the results; the values between 0-0.6 were equivalent to ''poor,'' values between 0.6-0.7 were considered as ''average,'' values between 0.7-0.8 stand were labeled ''medium,'' and those between 0.8-0.9 and 0.9-1 were classified as ''good'' and ''excellent,'' respectively. By assigning the average value to each interval (to avoid undervaluation, ''poor'' was assigned to the midpoint of ''0.5-0.6''.), the evaluation set was then quantified as:
The weight of an efficacy index represents the role of each index in a systematic evaluation [12] , which can be determined by subjective and objective weighting methods. Subjective weighting compares the importance of the indices according to expert preferences and experiences. A judgment matrix is obtained and then the weights of the indices VOLUME 8, 2020 are obtained using the AHP. During objective weighting, a corresponding mathematical model is used to calculate the weights of indices for known real data, including entropyweighting methods. The combined weighting method used here involved the combination of subjective and objective weighting methods, which has the capacity to make full use of their advantages and avoid their disadvantages, thereby obtaining a more accurate algorithm [13] .
Because of the uncertainty in expert evaluation processes, the determination of index weights was based on the interval number eigenvalue method (IEM), which is one of the algorithms for obtaining the weights of judgment matrices in the uncertain type of the AHP. The resultant interval number was relatively greater according to experts. Compared with the traditional AHP, the IEM combined the randomness and fuzziness of interval numbers with the subjectivity of the AHP, enhancing the reliability of index weights. The steps in the IEM used in this study were as follows:
(1) A judgment matrix of interval numbers was constructed. The interval number included the upper and lower limits of the interval. The importance of the indices was identified according to the 1-9 scaling method proposed by Saaty [14] and the interval number judgment matrix was obtained. Taking the repeater spoofing and jamming mode as an example, the values shown in Table 1 were obtained. (2) The index weight interval was calculated using interval eigenvalues in which the judgment matrix A = ([a L ij , a U ij ]) n×n was decomposed into two matrices A L = (a L ij ) n×n and A U = (a U ij ) n×n , and the eigenvec-
n ) corresponding to the maximum eigenvalues were solved. The eigenvector of the maximum eigenvalue corresponding to A was [15] 
in the formula [16] , [17] 
(3) A definite value transformation of the weight interval was performed. The index weights obtained by the IEM were expressed using interval numbers, which could not directly be applied to numerical calculations. Therefore, it was necessary to convert the weight intervals into definite values. For this purpose, a three-unit connection number during set-paired analysis was used to transform the weight intervals into definite values, following the methods detailed in a previous study [17] . Finally, the obtained subjective weights of the indices of each spoofing mode were 
The basic idea of an entropy-weighting method is to use the information contained in each index to calculate the weight. The smaller the index information entropy, the more information it can provide, and the greater the weight assigned [18] . However, to reduce the uncertainty of the evaluation; and because the quantified value of the index is an interval number; interval theory was introduced into the entropyweighting method for weighting and obtaining the weight of each index, w # ij . The steps in the entropy-weighting method used in this study were as follows:
(1) First, each index in the index set matrix, O, of spoofing the modes was de-dimensioned to obtain the normalized index set, X, illustrated as Table 2 . (3) The calculated entropy, S ij , is
(4) The entropy-weighted value, w # ij , of each index was calculated from
To highlight the subjective opinions of experts and to consider the objectivity of the evaluation, the aforementioned calculated weights were superimposed and δ = 0.65 [19] , which allowed for the effective combination of weights. Here, δ represents weight coefficient. The following equation could then be obtained.
Through (9) 
C. DETERMINATION OF TRIANGULAR MEMBERSHIP
Compared with the two traditional membership functions (shown in Fig. 2 ) [20] , the weight of the triangular with trapezoidal membership function (Fig. 2b) was more proportional to the evaluation set, whose evaluation results were expected to be better. Therefore, a triangular with trapezoidal membership function was deemed to be the most suitable approach towards evaluating the effectiveness of GNSS spoofing and jamming equipment. The formulae for calculating the triangular with trapezoidal membership function were expressed in (12) , and the definition of each variable was summarized in Table 2 . The membership of single factors corresponding to the five levels of the evaluation set were determined as:
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D. DETERMINATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION VALUE
Considering the single-factor membership values and evaluation set, the fuzzy evaluation values of single factors, which are interval vectors, were obtained as
By using single-factor evaluation values and the final weight value, the comprehensive evaluation interval value for the spoofing party could be obtained as (15) , shown at the bottom of the next page.
E. DETERMINATION OF THE JAMMING PROFIT MATRIX
The expert scoring method was used in this study to determine the horizontal and vertical weights (i.e., five spoofing modes were scored according to their jamming ability considering each anti-spoofing measure and a score of 10 represented the strongest jamming ability; Table 3 ). Additionally, four anti-spoofing measures were scored according to their defensive abilities. In this method, five experts were asked to assign scores. Among them, the third expert scored the measures according to the scenario of a single system with a single generated spoofing signal, which was representative. So, to save space, only score results of the third expert were listed and indicated in Tables 4 and 5 . In this case, i represented a certain spoofing mode, p was the total number of spoofing modes, j represented a certain anti-spoofing measure, q was the total number of anti-spoofing measures, and b ij and b ji represented the scores off a certain anti-spoofing measure and spoofing mode, respectively. The weight of each antagonistic mode was obtained from
The Different percentages can be assigned to the scoring weights based on the results of the previous study in [21] , to derive a comprehensive scoring weight set. The formula for assigning these percentages is
By weighting the comprehensive scoring weight set, J, relative to the comprehensive evaluation value, F, the effectiveness of spoofing and jamming,
, can be determined. Thus, the profit matrix, E, composed of all values of jamming efficacy may be defined as (19) , shown at the bottom of the next page.
IV. MIXED-STRATEGY GAME BASED ON BLIND INFORMATION
A blind information condition refers to a scenario in which spoofing equipment cannot judge all anti-spoofing measures of the other party, and the selection of the spoofing mode is completely based on the relevant knowledge from game theory. In general, the optimal pure strategy and jamming effectiveness of spoofing equipment under blind information conditions can be obtained using the minimax and maximin principles of game theory. However, if min 1≤j≤q ( max 1≤i≤p E ij ) = max 1≤i≤p ( min 1≤j≤q E ij ), there is no optimal pure strategy for spoofing equipment, but an optimal mixed strategy The spoofing mode selected according to this mixed strategy can ensure that the profit of the spoofing equipment is not less than E(X*, Y*), and the loss of the target machine is not greater than E(X*, Y*), thus causing the game to reach equilibrium.
A. JAMMING PROFIT MATRIX SOLUTION
To obtain the optimal mixed strategy, the profit matrix must be solved. Potential solution methods include linear programming and iterating Brownian algorithm. A linear programming algorithm can solve a profit matrix of any order and is more convenient and faster than the iterative method. Therefore, a linear programming algorithm was adopted in this study. The steps for solving the profit matrix were as follows:
(1) For spoofing equipment, if X* meets the requirements:
x i * = 1, x i * ≥ 0, then v > 0 and x i * /v = x i , and the jamming profit of the spoofing equipment is not less than v. This can be expressed as
The optimal solution, x i , and the optimal mixed strategy, x i * = vx i , can be obtained by solving this linear function. (2) For a target machine, if Y * meets the requirements: q j=1 E ij y j * ≤ ω, i = 1, 2, · · · , p and q j=1 y j * = 1, y j * ≥ 0, then ω > 0 and y j * /ω = y j , and the loss of the target machine is no greater than ω. This can be expressed as
The optimal solution, y j , and the optimal mixed strategy, y j * = ωy j , can be obtained by solving this linear function
B. DETERMINATION OF THE OPTIMAL MIXED STRATEGY
By using linear programming, the obtained profit matrix,E L , may be converted into two dual-linear programming problems, the solutions of which are
0.3980y 1 + 0.3767y 2 + 0.3732y 3 + 0.3478y 4 ≤ 1 0.3002y 1 + 0.3515y 2 + 0.4051y 3 + 0.4667y 4 ≤ 1 0.4726y 1 + 0.3984y 2 + 0.3400y 3 + 0.3657y 4 ≤ 1 0.3941y 1 + 0.4305y 2 + 0.3074y 3 + 0.3379y 4 ≤ 1 0.4032y 1 + 0.4097y 2 + 0.4144y 3 + 0.3612y 4 ≤ 1 (23) where v and ω are the winning expectation values of both sides. The optimal mixed strategy of E L obtained by solving (23) 
The optimal mixed strategy of E U can be obtained in the same manner. Thus, the minimum jamming profit range suitable for any test scenario is
In the real-world environment, the minimum jamming profit value of spoofing and jamming performed by the equipment should be within the range calculated by (25). The closer the profit value is to the maximum value of the interval, the stronger the spoofing and jamming capability of the equipment in the dynamic game. If the value is not within this range, the equipment may fail to interfere because of its poor ability or it may be monitored by the anti-spoofing party.
V. DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF SPOOFING AND JAMMING DECISION-MAKING IN A REAL SCENARIO A. TEST SCENARIO AND INDEX VALUE ACQUISITION
The diamond tests (Fig. 3) were conducted using a satellite navigation spoofing signal simulator (shown in Fig. 3a 
a high-frequency oscilloscope (DS0V334A; Keysight Technol., USA), a EXA signal analyzer and a counter (N9010A and 53131A; Agilent Technol., USA), a time-interval counter (SR620; Stanford Technol., USA), and a timing and jamming antenna. Furthermore, a hand-held target machine (K82B; BHC Navigation Co., Ltd., China) was used on a test platform (as depicted in Fig. 3b ). At 10:22 a.m. (UTC) on November 5, 2019, the Global Positioning System (GPS) L1 C/A and Bei Dou Navigation Satellite (BDS) B1 signals were collected as examples. Spoofing control and data simulation software, which were self-developed, were employed to set up and run a spoofing scenario. The nominal power of the spoofing signal was −134 dBm, coherent accumulation time was 1 ms, and attenuation was set as 0 dB. The signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and stellar map received by the target machine are shown in Figure 4 .
During the test, the following three spoofing scenarios were set up, in which the real location of the target machine was a classroom in the school.
(1) Scenario 1: Using an indoor directional expelling scenario, the target was expelled southward from the parking lot of a shopping mall at a speed of 0.2 m/s (Fig. 5) . The signal access time, pseudo-range rate accuracy, and timing accuracy of the synchronous clock ( Fig. 6) were tested with reference to the steps shown in Table 7 ; (2) Scenario 2: The target was deceptively led toward Arxan Mountain (Inner Mongolia) using a fixed-point spoofing scenario (Fig. 7) , and the pseudo-range measuring accuracy was determined. The detection steps are shown in Table 7 . A total of 60 tests were conducted, and the obtained pseudo-range measuring accuracy of the simulator was approximately 6 m; (3) Scenario 3: A track spoofing scene was used to give the target machine the illusion of moving in a circular motion with a radius of 100 m, a speed of 40 m/s, and an initial direction of 60 o at the high altitude of a grassland in Hulun Buir (Fig. 8) ; and the success rate of the spoofing was identified. The entire track contained 574 points; because the power of the spoofing signal transmitted by the simulator was close to that of the real signal and the gain was 0 dB, the receiver was easily pulled by the real signal and mismatched for a short time, resulting in some positions deviating from the track. By using the detection steps of the corresponding indicators shown in Table 7 , the obtained success rate of simulated spoofing was 83%. A dynamic field test was necessary to complete the test of the accuracy of spoofing positioning, as shown in Table 7 . The coordinate positions were based on the gaussian coordinate system. The smaller the difference was between the coordinates, the closer the curves were to zero. Furthermore, the higher the positioning accuracy was, the better the test results were. A total of seven tests were conducted on October 25, 2019, and the four tests (second test, fourth test, sixth test and seventh test) with the best results were selected to obtain the test results, as shown in Fig. 9 and Table 6 .
The results showed that the y-and h-directions were relatively stable, whereas significant fluctuations were observed in the x-direction. Moreover, the positioning accuracies for the y-, h-, and x-directions were 0.044 m, 0.046 m, VOLUME 8, 2020 and 0.065 m, respectively. These values could meet the requirements of the spoofing evaluation.
By using the evaluation process proposed in this study, and under the specified test scenarios, when the simulator was spoofing and jamming, the profit matrix formed by the jamming effect was: The profit matrix was solved using a linear programming algorithm and the obtained minimum jamming profit, E = 0.5500. This result shows that the tested simulator had a strong spoofing and jamming ability in navigation antagonism and was thus applicable in real-world environments.
B. DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF SPOOFING AND JAMMING DECISION-MAKING
Jamming decision-making is an uncertain process. With the advancement of a game, the jamming strategy of a simulator changes when the target machine changes its defense strategy. However, the varying ability to recognize the defense strategy adopted by the target machine largely determines the selected jamming strategy. The three types of decision-making processes in such real scenarios are as follows:
(1) Under the blind information condition, the simulator will not judge any anti-spoofing measure taken by the target machine. It can only directly use the linear programming algorithm to derive the optimal mixed strategy, X * = (0.4264, 0.0168, 0.3148, 0.0217, 0.2203), of the spoofing party, and the jamming profit is ≥0.5500. Therefore, in a real-world scenario, the spoofing equipment will adopt the repeater spoofing mode or a spoofing mode in the capture phase for interference;
(2) A partial-information condition refers to a part of the anti-spoofing measures adopted by the target machine of the other party that spoofing equipment can identify. Assuming that the spoofing party knows that the antispoofing party will not use a target machine equipped with a high-precision clock, then the spoofing party will enter into a selection state of partial information. This would be transformed into a linear programming problem to obtain the optimal mixed strategy, X * = (0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0743, 0.0001, 0.9256), of the simulator. At this time, the spoofing party will adopt the spoofing strategy of a multi-antenna transmitting signal, and the jamming profit will be greater than or equal to 0.5791. Thus, the profit of the simulator is greater under a partial information condition than it is under blind information conditions. However, following the increased exhaustiveness of the information on the spoofing party, its jamming profit will also increase.
(3) A complete information condition means that the equipment can completely identify all the anti-spoofing measures of the other party's target machine. At this time, the spoofing party will choose the strategy with the greatest jamming profit according to all the identified information. Based on (26), if the target machine chooses a receiver equipped with a high-precision clock, the simulator will directly select generation spoofing and jamming, and the jamming profit will be 0.6351. Simultaneously, the target machine will immediately change its original strategy and choose an integrated receiver with a multiple GNSS system. The jamming profit of the simulator will then decline to 0.4085. In order to improve the jamming profit, the spoofing party will then immediately change its strategy to spoofing and jamming in the capture stage and their jamming profit will increase to 0.6972.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this study, the methods of game theory were used to obtain an index system corresponding to the different spoofing modes. In particular, a combined weight and an interval-valued fuzzy comprehensive evaluation was performed. Thereafter, the profit matrix was established, and the value of jamming efficacy was evaluated. Finally, the method was validated using real-world examples.
In the real test environment, the minimum jamming profit of the equipment conducting spoofing and jamming should be within [0.3905, 0.6114]. The closer the profit is to the maximum value of the range, the stronger is the spoofing and jamming abilities of the equipment in the dynamic game of navigation antagonism. If the value of jamming efficacy is not within the range, the equipment is ineffective at spoofing. The minimum jamming profit of the tested simulator was E = 0.5500, which indicates that the spoofing equipment used in this study exhibited high spoofing and jamming capabilities and thus is applicable in real-world environments.
Compared with the traditional evaluation methods, the interval theory and fuzzy theory were first combined to reduce the fuzziness and randomness of the influencing factors. By using game theory, the static evaluation mode was changed, and the dynamic effectiveness was studied by adjusting it according to the strategies adopted by both sides during the navigation antagonism. Subsequently, the feasibility of the method was demonstrated via examples. Future studies should focus on establishing additional navigation antagonism field experiments to develop more accurate models and more effective spoofing as well as jamming equipment. 
